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There is a high demand for secure and reliable communi-
cations for Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) in the
automotive industry. Privacy and security are key issues in
CAVs, where network attacks can result in fatal accidents.
The computational time, cost and robustness of encryption
algorithms are important factors in low latency 5G-enabled
secureCAVnetworks. The presented chaotic Tangent-Delay
Ellipse Reflecting Cavity-Map (TD-ERCS) system and Piece-
Wise Linear Chaotic Map (PWLCM) based encryption on
short messages exchanged in a CAV network provide both
robustness and high speed encryption. In this work, we pro-
pose a 5G radio network architecture, which leveragesmul-
tiple radio access technologies and utilizes Cloud Radio Ac-
cess Network (CRAN) functionalities for privacy preserved
and secure CAV networks. The proposed Vehicular Safety
Message (VSM) identifier algorithmmeets transmission re-
quirements with a high probability of 85% for low round trip
delay of ≤ 50ms. The proposed chaos based encryption al-
gorithm exhibits faster speeds with a computational time of
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are an important use case of future 5G enabled vehicular networks. CAVs are
vital in improvingmobility, increasing comfort and addressing the socio-environmental cost of transport. These vehicular
networks enable communication with each other or with the infrastructure. There are a number of unprecedented
benefits of communication enabled applications. CAVs tend to improve road safety by exploiting safety application
protocols, providing a new field of view and range, which in turn can provide quantitative and qualitative information to
be shared throughV2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) andV2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) communications. The cost of positioning
and communications hardware is significantly less than the sensing equipment required to cover the 360-degree
envelope around the vehicle. UK government has plans to eliminate road signs on highways by 2027 [1]. The road
signs alongwith other informationwill be disseminated to vehicles on the highway using radio technologies. With all
these applications, key concerns with the integrity and privacy of wireless communications are on the rise. Preserving
integrity and robustness of these vehicular networks is vital. Hijack of controls or reception of false information can be
a safety hazard for CAVs, resulting in fatal accidents and loss of life. This gives rise to an entire domain of cyber security
for automotive [2].
F IGURE 1 5GCommunication Network for CAVs.
A variety of Radio Access Technologies (RATs) including 5GNewRadio (NR), 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) [3], Ded-
icated Short Range Communications (DSRC - IEEE 802.11p) [4] etc, have been proposed for vehicular communications.
The ubiquitous nature of mobile networks, LTE and corresponding 5G technologies, makes them potential candidates
ANSARI ET AL. 3
for CAV communications. Sub-domains or additional functionalities of these technologies such as LTE-Vehicular (LTE-V),
Device to Device (D2D communications), evolvedMachine Type Communications (eMTC), etc. have also been studied
extensively to achieve V2V communications. However, current research has proposed achieving V2V communications
through the infrastructure to preserve the privacy of users, avoiding the complexities of direct communications. The
most promising RAT is the 5GNewRadio (NR), which proposes a dedicated service oriented core for CAVs. Furthermore,
5G affiliated technologies such as Cloud Radio Access Network (CRAN) employingMobile Edge Computing (MEC) are
becoming favourites for achieving robust and low latency communications [5].
Heterogeneous Vehicular Networks (HetVANETs) suggest an interface that can integrate DSRC, 4G LTE and 5G
NR to achieve a 100% up-time. Figure 1 illustrates a 5G architecture that employs a multi-RAT access management
protocol to sustain the heterogeneous radio network in harmony. The core network (CN) have a dedicated slice for
vehicular safety communications and consists of Software DefinedNetwork (SDN) controllers that enable the interface
of CRANwith the CN using a set of underlying forwarding nodes.
CAVswill continuously share their informationwith other vehicles and the infrastructure. This information includes
vehicle properties and behaviours, gathered from the on-board vehicle sensors. In the case of an attack, the adversary
can eavesdrop on the sensitive information being shared between the vehicles. The content of this information depends
on the application being utilised by the vehicle. In the case of safety applications, the content can be the vehicle location,
speed or direction. The road safetymessage server on receiving this information, maintains a comprehensive picture
of the vehicular network. Specific warnings and notifications are then forwarded to vehicles which are potentially
in a dangerous scenario. In these cases, a small change in this information by the attacker can have a chain reaction
leading to fatal accidents. The motivation of this work is to protect the integrity of this sensitive information while
maintaining the application’s transmission requirements. In this paper, we implement privacy preserving protocol while
addressing CAV latency requirements and computational time cost of chaotic encryption. Vehicular networks have
stringent transmission requirements which are scarcely met by present day network functionalities [6]. Adding privacy
to these links brings about overheads that in turn increase latency.
Encryption is a process that convert plaintext data to a form known as ciphertext data so that an intruder/attacker
cannot access the original information. Decryption is the reverse process of encryption where the ciphertext message is
converted back to the original data. In the past two decades, a strong relationship between chaos and cryptography
has been proved, specified in [7, 8, 9, 10]. Chaotic maps produce random output which is highly sensitive to the initial
condition known as the key parameters. Decryption of plaintext is not feasible if initial condition is unknown. Only an
authorised personwho has the key can decrypt the original data. Due to initial parameter sensitivity and light-weight
nature of chaotic maps, it is widely used for real-time encryption of sensitive information [9, 10]. Such lightweight
chaotic encryption are instrumental for low latency communications in CAV networks due to their lower computational
time cost and robustness to attacks. In line with the key concerns and corresponding research gaps discussed above, the
contributions of this paper include the following:
1. 5G radio network architecture utilizingmultiple radio access technologies and exploiting CRAN virtual network
functionalities for serving connected autonomous vehicle networks.
2. Vehicular safety message notification identifier algorithm that tends tomeet safety application requirements while
efficiently utilizing radio resources.
3. TD-ERCS and PWLCMbased encryption for preserving privacy in CAV networks.
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2 | VEHICULAR ROAD SAFETY PROTOCOLS
Vehicle safety is of paramount importance for CAVs and a number of applications that increase road safety can be
achievedWith transmission of data between vehicles and infrastructure. These safety applications are for vehicles
both with or without driver. A number of studies, meetings, and proceedings have put forth various communication use
cases for road safety. Some of these presented use cases vary depending on their development organisation, while most
tend to cover major aspects of road safety. Major use cases with their required transmission parameters compiled with
the survey of [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] are included in Table 1. These applications are notifications for vehicles, drivers and
road users which serve the purpose of increasing road safety, reducing hazard risks and eventually improving driver
assistance/experience. These same notifications can help autonomous vehicles make real-time decisions on the road.
This opens up the space for autonomous vehicles to be safer than regular vehicles as it would be aware of situations not
visible or perceivable by naked eye or on-board sensors.
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in [16, 17] classified these short vehicular safety mes-
sages (beacons) into Cooperative AwarenessMessage (CAMs) and Decentralized Environment NotificationMessages
(DENMs). CAMs are distributed within the network and provide information like the presence, position as well as basic
set of communications within the neighbouring vehicles over a single hop. CAMs come under the category of periodic
messages and are transmitted or received by all the vehicles present in the awareness range1. On the reception of
CAMs, the vehicle is made aware of all the neighbours and their positions, movements and other basic attributes along
with basic sensor information. On the other hand DENMs are used by Cooperative Road HazardWarnings (CRHW) and
come under the category of eventmessages, which include all event-based applications. When an event is detected,
DENMs specific to that event are transmitted with a certain periodicity. This broadcasting of DENmessages continues
until the end or expiry of the event.
Broadcasting, multicasting or unicasting are used for the transmission of thesemessages among vehicles. From
Table 1, it can be observed that most of these safety messages are supposed to be delivered in the vicinity of the
transmitter. For example, vehicles involved in an intersection collision and present in the surrounding area are notified
of the hazard by the vehicle that detects the collision through their sensors by periodically broadcasting CAMsmessage.
Vulnerable drivers, motorcycles and emergency vehicles can also broadcast DENMmessages tomake others aware of
their presence in the vicinity. With the information of surrounding traffic situation, vehicle drivers can also be assisted
in changing lanes, stopping at stop signs, merging intomain roads, etc.
Another salient feature of safety applications is the periodicity of message transmission. Due to the rapid topology
change and high mobility of vehicles, safety application requires the safety beacons to be transmitted at a certain
frequency depending on the application. For instance, intersection collision warning is required to be transmitted 10
times a secondwhichmeans themessage needs to be transmitted every 100ms. Kato [19] defined the concept of data
freshness and used this parameter to evaluate the performance of LTE networks for vehicular communications. If a
vehicle application transmits a packet at a frequency of 10Hz, whichmeans amessage is transmitted every 100ms, the
freshness requirement for that specific application would be 100ms. By this principle, if themessage is received after
100ms it can be considered as lost. Similarly, for other applications like slow vehicle indication, 2messages per second
are sufficient. This periodicity puts load on the network and as evident from previous studies carried out by [20, 21],
network degrades with the increasingmessage frequency.
Applicability of safety messages are usually constrained within a certain radius. For instance, traffic light speed
1Araniti [3] and Bazzi [18] elaborated awareness range, which is the geographical area around the vehicle, where all the neighbours are to be made cognizant
of the vehicle. Awareness range is also termed as relevance range for DENMs and in general are also termed as the applicable transmission range of safety
messages.
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TABLE 1 Vehicular Safety Applications and their Transmission Requirements.








CAM Broadcasting Periodic Mes-
sages
10Hz ∼100ms 150m
Lane Change Assistance CAM Cooperation awareness be-
tween vehicles
10Hz ∼100ms 150m
SlowVehicle Indication CAM /DENM Broadcasting State Periodi-
cally
2 Hz ∼100ms 200m
Traffic Light Speed Advi-
sory/Violation
CAM /DENM Broadcasting Periodic Mes-
sages






Head on Collision Warn-
ing
CAM Broadcasting Periodic Mes-
sages
10Hz ∼100ms 200m










CAM /DENM Broadcasting Periodic Mes-
sages
2 Hz ∼100ms 300m
Cooperative Merging As-
sistance
CAM Cooperation awareness be-
tween vehicles
1 Hz ∼1000ms 250m
Speed Limits Notification CAM Broadcasting Periodic Mes-
sages
1 – 10Hz ∼100ms 300m
Motorcycle Approaching
Indication
CAM Cooperation awareness be-
tween vehicles
2 Hz ∼100ms 150m
Curve SpeedWarning DENM Broadcasting curve loca-
tion, curvature and speed
limit
1 Hz ∼1000ms 200m





CAM /DENM Broadcasting Periodic Mes-
sages
10Hz ∼100ms 200-500m
advisory and violation would only be around the traffic light, while an emergency vehicle would need to notify vehicles
of its presence in its routes vicinity. Message type, communication mode, message frequency, critical latency and
awareness range included in Table 1 are themost critical aspects to be addressed by communication technologies for
vehicle road safety.
2.1 | C-RAN for C-V2X
Cloud Radio AccessNetwork promises to bring the server processing to the edge of the network, subsequently reducing
experienced end-to-end delay. The Scalability of mobile network servers where different locations of the server are
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evaluated show that by having forwardingmechanism implemented close to the base station, it significantly increases
the network capacity, where almost 50%more vehicles experience the required transmission delay [6]. The CRAN
functionality, splitting the network functionality and introducingmobile edge computing [22], allows the implementation
of message forwarding server close to the access network edge. For the evaluation of CRAN for V2X, we implement the
Road SafetyMessage Server on theMobile Cloud Engine residing at the edge of the network. We discuss our findings
later in the Section 4. Themobile cloud engine (MCE) residing within the CRAN comprises of network functionalities for
radio resourcemanagement and application provision. RAN functions such as cloud Radio Resource Control (cRRC) is
to facilitate multi-connectivity and new technology deployment, whereas the centralized Radio ResourceManagement
(cRRM) entity is to ensure efficient coordination of resources in heterogeneous networks. CRAN will also have a
user-plane gateway (GW-U) and an authentication confirmation (AC) entity. The role and functionality of the Vehicular
Road Safety (VRS)Message Server is explained in the following subsection.
2.2 | VSNProtocol Identifier (V SNid )
Radio resources in the licensed band are expensive, which calls for mechanisms to efficiently utilize the wireless
reserves. The vehicle safety network protocol identifier (V SNid ) proposed in Algorithm1 adds a notification identifier
that specifies the Vehicle Road Safety (VRS) server about the application requirements. These include the required
awareness range and the demanding periodicity of themessage. The VRS server maintains a look up table containing
the applications and their corresponding transmission requirements. Assuming vehicle (vehi ) transmits a Vehicle
Safety Message (VSM) containing theV SNid . The VRS server will obtain the awareness range (Ri ) and periodicity
requirements (also termed as beacon frequency (BF )) from its look up table. Among other information, the exchanged
packet also contains vehicle location (di ), using this in conjunction with the information from themap database and Ri ,
the VRS server determines the intended receiving vehicles set also termed as forwarding set (Fi j ). [6, 23] Exploiting the
state-of-the-art CRAN technologies, the virtualized VRS server operating at the radio edge will thenmulticast the VSM
to the forwarding set of vehicles given by:
Fi j = {k : di j < Ri , i  j }, (1)
Similar principles can be used in exchanging control messages for fleets of autonomous vehicles. Asmentioned in
Section 1, controlling the vehicle remotely in the case of sensor failure has foundmuch importance. Exchanging of this
control informationwill require privacy preservingmechanisms to avoid threats and fatalities. Therefore, this paper
extends this contribution by proposing the use of TD-ERCS and PWLCMbased privacy preserving encryption on VSM
payloads.
2.3 | Privacy Preserving Lightweight Encryption
A chaotic map can effectively provide the required confusion and diffusion necessary for effective encryption [24]. In
cryptography, confusion and diffusion are twomain steps which were defined by Shannon in his theory in the year 1945
[25]. Chaotic maps has application in numerous fields including image, video and audio encryption [9, 10, 26]. Initially,
the purpose of chaos-based cryptographywasmainly focused on higher speed rather than just security, however, the
focus of research has now shifted toward higher security while maintaining these high speeds so that an intruder cannot
decode the original real-time information [10]. In this work, we propose a secure, light-weight and efficient encryption
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Algorithm 1VSMForwarding Algorithm
Input: VSMs : vehi −→V RS
Output: VSMs :V RS −→ vehj
System Setup :
1: VRSmaintains local area roadmap
2: whileV RS ← encr ypt ed (VSMi ) do
3: VRS decrypts payload
4: VSMi −→ (VSNID ,V SM (vehi ))
5: VSNID −→ (Ri , BFi )
6: V SM (vehi ) −→ P osi t i on(di )
7: (Ri , di ) −→ Di st ance(di j )
8: Fi j = {k : di j < Ri , i  j },
9: Encrypt (V SMi )
10: V RS ⇒ vehj ∈ Fi j at BFi
11: endwhile
12: return Fi j
scheme for vehicle safety. The proposed scheme is based on two chaotic maps: (i) TD-ERCS and (ii) PWLCMwhich are
further explained in Section 3.2.
3 | SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 | CAVConnectivity Simulation Environment
The vehicular network is assumed to be composed of N vehicles uniquely identified by their number i , (i = 1 . . .N ). For
the sake of consistency, vehicles are assumed to use LTE FDD radio transceivers. The work in this paper builds on to the
performance evaluation from [20] that takes in account multicell andmultipath propagation along with 3GPP specified
Extended Vehicular A (EVA) fading environment. The networkmodeled is a 2 × 2 km2 area of Glasgow city center (GCC)
(Figure 2) implemented in ns-3 [27]. Mobility of the vehicles in the network is generated using routesmobility model
which assigns each vehicle with a route generated using Google maps API [28]. The network design considers enhanced
realism throughmodels employing the site configuration used by UK’s mobile operator EE in Glasgow [29]. The CRAN
functionality is modelled by introducing the proposed message forwarding mechanism implemented as a detached
entity located within the RAN using an extended version of LTE EPCNetwork simulAtor (LENA)module [30].
Parameters chosen for the simulationmodel are given in Table 2. Vehicular safety messages aremodeled as packets
of 256bytes including all protocol headers and associated overheads. In order for the vehicle to access multiple
radio interfaces, encryption is carried out on the payload of the packet. This is comprised of 184bytes carrying vital
information about the vehicle. The following subsection presents the chaotic encryption scheme utilized.
3.2 | TD-ERCS and PWLCM chaoticMaps
In the recent years, chaos-based cryptography has received a lot of attention from the research community [31]. This
is due to the sensitivity and random nature of chaotic maps which can play a vital role in privacy preservation and
encryption technologies. However, research shows that one dimensional (1D) chaotic maps such as logistic and skew
tent map are insecure and cannot provide effective solution in cryptography [32]. This is due to the lower key space and
low range for the initial conditions. Professor Li proposed [33] a novel 2D discrete chaotic map known as Tangent-Delay
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F IGURE 2 The 2x2 km2 modelled area of GlasgowCity Centre with 14 existing LTEMasts of EE.
Ellipse Reflecting Cavity-Map System (TD-ERCS) which can effectively reduce 1D chaotic map issues and hence it can
be employed in any system for secure communication. The random outputs produced from TD-ERCSmap are equi-
probable, zero correlation in total field and significant initial value space [24]. In TD-ERCS iteration double precision
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TABLE 2 Vehicle Connectivity Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation time 100 seconds.
Roadmodel GlasgowCity Center (GCC) (2km x 2km)
Network layout 14 sites with 3 cells/site, UKOperator EEmast data [29].
Scheduling algorithm Proportional Fair.
Handover algorithm A2A4RSRQ, RSRQ threshold -5 dB,
andNeighbourCellOffset=2 (1 dB).
Frequency reuse Distributed Fractional Freq. Reuse.
Path loss model LogDistance (α = 4) and
3GPP Extended Vehicular Amodel.
Safetymessage format 256bytes UDP.
Number of vehicles 100, 150.
Average vehicle’s speed 20 km/h, 40 km/h.
Beacon frequency 1Hz, 10Hz.







μ2 n < m
− xn−myn−m
μ2 n ≥ m
(4)
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F IGURE 4 Downlink flow diagram
y0 = μ
√
1 − x20 (5)





tanα + k ′0




μ ∈ (0, 1)
x0 ∈ [−1, 1]
α ∈ (0, π)
m = 2, 3, 4, 5...
(8)
In above equations, xn and yn are random sequences generated using seed parameters μ, x0, α andm of TD-ERCSmap.
These seed parameters are used as secret keys when encrypting the data. The output of PieceWise Linear ChaoticMap
(PWLCM) is more chaotic than the traditional logistic map as outlined in [24]. A small change in initial key parameters
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can drastically change the output of themap. Mathematically, PWLCM is written as [34]:




μ , if zn ∈ [0, μ]
1−zn
1−μ , if zn ∈ (μ, 0.5]
F (1 − zn ), if zn ∈ (0.5, 1]
(9)
where, zn is random chaotic values and μ is control parameter. Thesemechanisms are implemented within the LTE V2X
uplink and downlink flows as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively.
Furthermore, chaotic maps such as Logistic and Skew tent maps exhibit complex properties in a very simple
mathematical formula and one can encrypt a message using the properties of chaos maps. However, as mentioned
earlier, one-dimensional maps such as Logistic and Skewmaps have lower key space issues, making way for an attacker
to launch key space/brute force attack. One of the properties of a chaotic map is that a small change in initial conditions
can generate a different output which is an important property for an encryption algorithm. TD-ERCSmap generate
different output when the initial conditions are slightly changed. In the Figure 5, when the initial conditions are slightly
changed from 0.6000 to 0.6001, it can be observed that after the 14th iteration, themap produced a different output.
F IGURE 5 Change in the Initial Condition of ChaoticMap.
3.3 | Security Analysis and Latency Performance
Due to the imperative safety, most of the applications require the transmission and successful reception of message to
have an end-to-end delay of less than 100ms. These requirements are set forth by SDOs andOEMs, however, authors
in [35, 36] benchmarked their evaluations with latency being less than 50ms.
4 | FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The histogram shown in Figure 6 highlights the security of the proposed chaos-based encryption. One can see from the
Figure 6(b) that the histogram of the encrypted data is different from the original data histogram (Figure 6(a). Addition-
ally, the encrypted data histogram is comparably flat. In previous research [24], it is outlined that the keyspace of an
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(a) Original Data
(b) Histogram of plaintext and encrypted data
F IGURE 6 Vehicular Safety Protocol Packet Data.
encryption algorithmmust be greater than 2100 . In the proposed scheme, the keyspace for TD-ERCS and PWLCM is 2299
which is much higher than traditional Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The
speed of the proposed chaos-based scheme along with AES is evaluated on Intel Core i5, 4GB RAMusing native C/C++
implementation, exhibiting significantly lower latency than AESwith a time cost of only 2-3ms to encrypt the packet. As
a result,the proposed scheme does not introduce any significant delay for real-time applications. Furthermore, we have
carried out correlation coefficient, number of bit change rate (NBCR) and unified average change intensity (UACI) tests
[24]. Simulation results show that the correlation between original and ciphertext message is 0.05. Mathematically,
the value of correlation is between -1 and 1, where 1 shows exactly similar, 0 shows completely different and -1 shows
negative of original message. In our case, correlation value of 0.05 indicates a higher security of the proposed scheme.
Moreover, for a slight change in chaotic map parameters, a significant change in NBCR andUACI is observed during
simulation. The value of NBCR and UACI are 99.19% and 33.11, respectively. The aforementioned security evaluation
parameters shows that proposed scheme is resistant against entropy, statistical and differential attacks.
The fast changing topology of vehicular networks due to their mobile nature brings about challenges inmessage
dissemination. The evaluation of experienced latency over such an architecture is vital. We compare our proposed
scheme with the traditional vehicular networks communicating over a similar architecture with no encryption in
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place. First we compare results for 100 and 150 vehicles operating in our defined simulationmodel, utilizing the VSN
protocol with 1Hzmessage periodicity against similar scenario employing the proposed privacy preserving lightweight
encryption.
Figure 7 shows a cumulative density function (CDF) of end-to-end delay experienced by 100 and 150 vehicles
transmitting one message every second. It is evident for 100 vehicles the probability of having an end-to-end delay
of less than or equal to 50ms is about 85%. Adding encryption to this scenario changes this probability by only 1%.
This negligible increase in delay occurs because of the lightweight nature of the proposed encryption. As discussed in
the last subsection, the size of the packet remains the samewith the addition of encryption, hence, due to no added
overheads the network latency remains the samewith slight addition of encryption/decryption computational time.
With themessage periodicity of 1Hz, the network does not undergo significant loads. Therefore, to get amore clearer
picture, we next evaluate the network with amessage periodicity of 10Hz.
F IGURE 7 End-to-End delay with 100 and 150 vehicles transmitting vehicle safety messages at 1Hz packet
frequency.
F IGURE 8 End-to-End delay with 100 and 150 vehicles transmitting vehicle safety messages at 10Hz packet
frequency.
In Figure 8 the vehicles transmit 10 messages every second. With this beacon frequency, a considerable load is
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placed on the network, resulting in higher delays due to network congestion. The probability of delay being ≤ 50ms
decreases from 85% to almost 70% for 100 vehicles. However, only 1% differencewith the addition of our proposed
encryption scheme is observed. Similarly, for 150 vehicles, the probability of delay being ≤ 40ms is 58%which decreases
to roughly around 56%with the proposed encryption scheme. The results for the two scenarios as illustrated in Figure 7
and Figure 8, show that the proposed encryption scheme maintains the latency and fulfils the strict transmission
requirements of CAVs.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a reliable, secure and privacy-preservingmessage dissemination scheme for CAV networks. Low
latency communication is an important factor for 5G-enabled CAV networks and demands fast encryption algorithms
that canmeet the transmission requirements. A 5G radio network architecture with multiple radio access technologies,
exploiting CRAN functionalities is presented and evaluated for secure CAV networks. The novel secure VSM identifier
algorithm introduced in this work, meets the end-to-end delay demands with a high probability of 85% for a round
trip time (RTT) of 50ms. A robust and high speed chaotic encryption scheme based on TD-ERCS system and PWLCM
is proposed and utilized for messages exchanged in a CAV network. The presented encryption scheme is evaluated
using histograms and keyspace analysis for robustness, while computational time cost is measured to evaluate the
impact on network end-to-end delay. The presented chaos based encryption algorithm has a computational time cost of
2-3ms, which has insignificant impact on total transmission delays. In the future, we plan to extend our simulations to
include direct communications and real-time control of CAVs along with themodelling of network attacks with higher
dimensional chaotic maps.
REFERENCES
[1] Speed limits to be beamed into cars on sign-free roads | News | The Times;. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/
speed-limits-to-be-beamed-into-cars-on-sign-free-roads-hrcq7wlg9.
[2] Alnasser A, Sun H, Jiang J. Cyber security challenges and solutions for V2X communications: A survey. Computer Net-
works 2019;151:52 – 67. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128618306157.
[3] Araniti G, Campolo C, Condoluci M, Iera A, Molinaro A. LTE for vehicular networking: a survey. Communications Maga-
zine, IEEE 2013;51(5):148–157.
[4] Yin J, Yeung G, Ryu B, Habermas S, Talty T. Performance Evaluation of Safety Applications over DSRC Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks. Information Sciences 2004;p. 1–9.
[5] KatsarosK, DianatiM. 5. In: Evolution of Vehicular Communicationswithin theContext of 5G Systems JohnWiley Sons,
Ltd; 2019. p. 103–126. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781119515579.ch5.
[6] Ansari S, SánchezM,BoutalebT, Sinanovic S, GamioC,Krikidis I. SAI: safety application identifier algorithmatMAC layer
for vehicular safety message dissemination over LTE VANET networks. Wireless Communications andMobile Comput-
ing 2018;2018.
[7] Shujun L, XuanqinM, Yuanlong C. Pseudo-random bit generator based on couple chaotic systems and its applications in
stream-cipher cryptography. In: International Conference on Cryptology in India Springer; 2001. p. 316–329.
[8] ChenG,MaoY,ChuiCK. A symmetric imageencryption schemebasedon3Dchaotic catmaps. Chaos, Solitons&Fractals
2004;21(3):749–761.
ANSARI ET AL. 15
[9] Ahmad J, Khan MA, Ahmed F, Khan JS. A novel image encryption scheme based on orthogonal matrix, skew tent map,
and XOR operation. Neural Computing and Applications 2018;30(12):3847–3857.
[10] Ahmad J, Larijani H, Emmanuel R,MannionM, JavedA. OccupancyDetection inNon-residential Buildings–A Survey and
Novel Privacy PreservedOccupancyMonitoring Solution. Applied Computing and Informatics 2018;.
[11] Vehicle Safety Communications Project Task 3 Final Report. US Department of Transportation; 2005.
[12] Intelligent transport systems (ITS); basic set of applications; Part2: specification of cooperative awareness basic service;
2011.
[13] Intelligent transport systems (ITS); basic set of applications; part3: specifications of decentralized environmental notifi-
cation basic service; 2010.
[14] C L Robinson, D Caveney, L Caminiti, G Baliga, K Laberteaux andPR Kumar. Efficientmessage composition and coding
for cooperative vehicular safety applications. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 2007;56(6):3244–3255.
[15] Derek Caveney. Cooperative vehicular safety applications. IEEE Control Systems 2010;30(4):38–53.
[16] ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute). ETSI TS 102 637-2 Vehicular Communications ; Basic Set of
Applications ; Part 2 : Specification of Cooperative. History 2011;1:1–18.
[17] Etsi. TS 102 637-3 - V1.1.1 - Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications;
Part 3: Specifications of Decentralized Environmental Notification Basic Service 2010;1021(1):637–643.
[18] Bazzi A, Masini BM, Zanella A. Performance Analysis of V2V Beaconing Using LTE in Direct Mode With Full Duplex
Radios. IEEEWireless Communications Letters 2015Dec;4(6):685–688.
[19] Kato S, HiltunenM, Joshi K, Schlichting R. Enabling vehicular safety applications over LTE networks. 2013 International
Conference on Connected Vehicles and Expo, ICCVE 2013 - Proceedings 2013;p. 747–752.
[20] Z H Mir, and F Filali. LTE and IEEE 802.11p for vehicular networking: a performance evaluation. EURASIP Journal on
Wireless Communications andNetworking 2014;(1):1–15.
[21] Harding J, Powell G, YoonR, Fikentscher J, DoyleC, SadeD, et al. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications : Readiness of V2V
Technology for Application 2014;(August):327.
[22] Liarokapis D. Mobility prediction for traffic offloading in cloud cooperated mmWave 5G networks. In: Proceedings 9th
IEEE-GCC 2017 IEEE; 2018. Acceptance note in SAN Contacted author re expected publication date, author confirmed
delay in paper appearing in IEEE Xplore 23-7-18 Changed template to proceedings.
[23] Ansari S, Boutaleb T, Gamio C, Sinanovic S, Krikidis I, Marvin S. Vehicular Safety Application Identifier Algorithm for LTE
VANET Server 2016;p. 37–42.
[24] Ahmad J, Hwang SO. A secure image encryption scheme based on chaotic maps and affine transformation. Multimedia
Tools and Applications 2016;75(21):13951–13976.
[25] Shannon CE. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell system technical journal 1949;28(4):656–715.
[26] Habib Z, Khan JS, Ahmad J, KhanMA, Khan FA. Secure speech communication algorithm via DCT and TD-ERCS chaotic
map. In: 2017 4th International Conference on Electrical and Electronic Engineering (ICEEE) IEEE; 2017. p. 246–250.
[27] Model library release ns-3.2. Ns-3 network simulator; 2015, https://www.nsnam.org/docs/models/html/lte-design.
html.
[28] Cerqueira T, Albano M. RoutesMobilityModel: Easy Realistic Mobility Simulation Using External Information Services.
In: Proceedings of the 2015Workshop on Ns-3WNS3 ’15, New York, NY, USA: ACM; 2015. p. 40–46. http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/2756509.2756515.
16 ANSARI ET AL.
[29] CellMapper, Cellular Coverage and TowerMap for EENetwork in Glasgow;. https://www.cellmapper.net/.
[30] Baldo N. The ns-3 LTEmodule by the LENA project;.
[31] Murillo-Escobar MA, Meranza-Castillón MO, López-Gutiérrez RM, Cruz-Hernández C. Suggested Integral Analysis for
Chaos-Based Image Cryptosystems. Entropy 2019;21(8):815.
[32] Elmanfaloty RA, Abou-Bakr E. Random property enhancement of a 1D chaotic PRNG with finite precision implementa-
tion. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 2019;118:134–144.
[33] Sheng LY, Sun KH, Li CB. Study of a discrete chaotic system based on tangent-delay for elliptic reflecting cavity and its
properties 2004;.
[34] Khan MA, Ahmad J, Javaid Q, Saqib NA. An efficient and secure partial image encryption for wireless multimedia
sensor networks using discrete wavelet transform, chaotic maps and substitution box. Journal of Modern Optics
2017;64(5):531–540.
[35] Eren H, Pakka H, Alghamdi A, Yue Y. Instrumentation for safe vehicular flow in intelligent traffic control systems us-
ing wireless networks. In: Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE International Instrumentation and Measurement Technology
Conference IEEE; 2013. p. 1301–1305.
[36] Vinel A. 3GPP LTE versus IEEE 802.11p/WAVE:Which technology is able to support cooperative vehicular safety appli-
cations? IEEEWireless Communications Letters 2012;1(2):125–128.
